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Abstract 
The observation of the actual behavior by economic decision makers in the lab 
and in the field justifies that bounded rationality has been a generally accepted 
assumption  in  many  socio-economic  models.  The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to 
illustrate  the  difficulties  involved  in  providing  a  correct  definition  of  what  a 
rational (or irrational) agent is. In this paper we describe two frameworks that 
employ  different  approaches  for  analyzing  bounded  rationality.  The  first  is  a 
spatial segregation set-up that encompasses two optimization methodologies: 
backward induction and forward induction. The main result is that, even under 
the same state of knowledge, rational and non-rational agents may match their 
actions.  The  second  framework  elaborates  on  the  relationship  between 
irrationality and informational restrictions. We use the beauty contest (Nagel, 
1995) as a device to explain this relationship. 
!
1. Introduction 
Bounded  rationality  is  a  concept  used  in  different  fields  such  as  economics, 
psychology  and  computer  science,  among  others.  Many  models  of  human 
behavior  in  the  social  sciences  assume  that  humans  can  be  reasonably 
approximated or described as "rational" entities that would never fail to behave 
in  a  rational  way  according  to  their  preferences.  The  concept  of  bounded ! #!
rationality revises this assumption in order to account for the fact that perfectly 
rational  decisions  are  often  not  feasible  in  practice  due  to  the  finite 
computational resources available for making them. Herbert Alexander Simon 
(1916–2001) was the first to coin the term “bounded rationality”. This leading 
scientific  thinker,  whose  research  ranged  across  the  fields  of  cognitive 
psychology,  computer  science,  economics  and  sociology,  among  other 
disciplines, stressed the limitations of the concept of a rational agent against a 
real human being. In his two seminal papers, one of which was written for the 
Rand  Organisation  and  the  other  of  which  was  published  in  the  Quarterly 
Journal  of  Economics,  Simon  postulates  that  most  people  are  only  partly 
rational, and that they are in fact emotional in the remaining part of their actions.  
Simon  describes  a  number  of  dimensions  along  which  "classical"  models  of 
rationality can be made somewhat more realistic. These include a class of utility 
functions,  which  may  be  multi-valued  functions  or  recognizing  the  costs  of 
processing information.  
From a more theoretical point of view–particularly in game theory where the 
Nash equilibrium is the most important part–there is a vast amount of literature 
that  examines  the  consequence  of  bounded  rationality  on  the  set  of  Nash 
equilibrium outcomes. Following Aumman!s suggestion to use simple strategies 
as  an  approximation  to  bounded  rational  strategies,  Ariel  Rubinstein  (1986, 
1988,  1990)  and  Abraham  Neyman  (1985,1998)  proposed  modeling  such 
simple  strategies  as  finite  machines.  After  this  seminal  approach,  an  active 
branch  of  research  was  born,  giving  rise  to  a  new  approach  to  modeling 
repeated  games.  These  studies  have  enhanced  our  understanding  of  the ! $!
impact of limiting the set of possible strategies and provided answers on how 
cooperation  emerges  or  how  to  refine  equilibria  among  the  multiplicity 
correspondence  from  the  well-known  Folk  Theorem.  Actually,  cooperation  is 
justified under the assumption of bounded rationality. 
Another  way  to  capture  the  idea  of  bounded  rationality  is  by  assuming  that 
individuals are on average rational, and that a large amount of people can be 
approximately  modeled  to  act  as  boundedly  rational  agents  by  specifying 
explicit decision-making procedures. This puts the study of decision procedures 
on the research agenda. 
Daniel Kahneman proposes bounded rationality as a model to overcome some 
of the limitations of the rational-agent models in economic literature. In a joint 
work,  Kahneman  and  Twersky  refute  the  standard  use  of  the  economic 
decision-making paradigm. Moreover, they prove the emergence of emotional 
and procedural elements. The authors explore the psychology of intuitive beliefs 
and choices, while examining aspects of bounded rationality. More specifically, 
they generate a map of bounded rationality by exploring the systematic biases 
that separate the beliefs that people have, the choices they make from optimal 
beliefs,  and  the  choices  assumed  in  rational-agent  models.  This  work  is  a 
pioneering  approach  that  lies  at  the  foundation  of  behavioral  economics.  In 
addition, bounded rationality suggests that economic agents employ heuristics 
to make decisions rather than a strict rigid rule of optimization in light of the 
complexity  of  the  situation,  or  the  inability  to  process  and  compute  all  the 
possible  alternatives  due  to  deliberation  costs  and  the  presence  of  other 
economic activities. ! %!
Nowadays, it is widely accepted among the scientific community that human 
beings are limited either by the information they have, by their computational 
ability, or by the cognitive limitations of their minds.  
If we accept the fact that boundedly rational agents are limited in formulating 
and  solving  complex  problems  and  in  processing  information,  then  we  can 
accept  computational  approaches  for  understanding  the  decision-making 
process. In particular, models of bounded rationality help construct inference 
models  and  simulate  human  behavior  by  using  computers.  Edward  Tsang 
(2008)  argues  that  the  effective  rationality  of  agents  is  determined  by  their 
computational intelligence. Therefore, we assume that, in many circumstances, 
decision makers lack the ability and resources to arrive at the optimal solution, 
and instead apply their rationality only after having greatly simplified the choices 
available in a pre-processing stage. 
A common thread weaves through all of these branches, namely the idea that 
the  rational  man  is  a  “rara  avis”.  Behavioral  economics,  in  particular,  is  the 
branch where bounded rationality is the central theme. Indeed, the notability of 
behavioral  economics  stems  precisely  from  the  fact  that  it  connects  the 
assumption of bounded rationality with other disciplines. 
2. Bounded Rationality and Segregation 
2.1. Schelling!s segregation model 
Tomas Schelling was a forerunner in the study of segregation. In his first paper 
(1969, 1971a), he points out the impact of aggregating individual preferences ! &!
on the final landscape of the society. Schelling!s model starts by assuming a 
social context with n agents located in a geographical society. In his model, 
there are two types of agents: black agents and white agents. All agents have a 
preference  over  the  mixed  structure  of  their  neighborhood,  but  not  over  the 
specific configuration. This preference establishes when agents are happy in 
such a society. More specifically, a society consists of a set of agents located 
on a line or in a circle. Agents! utility is only affected by the structure of their 
local  neighborhood,  i.e.,  by  the  agents  to  the  right  and  to  the  left  of  them. 
Agents are defined by “type” (e.g., black or white) and by a number denoted as 
“tolerance”, which specifies the minimum ratio of close neighbors that must be 
of their same type in order to reach a state of happiness. For simplicity sake, we 
assume that the utility of each agent can be one or zero when the agent is 
happy or unhappy, respectively. For instance, an intolerant agent would be one 
who demands that all the neighbors next to her be of her same type, while a 
moderately tolerant agent would accept that half of her neighbors were like her. 
Schelling, moreover, allows unhappy agents to move across the geographical 
society  to  improve  their  individual  levels  of  happiness.  Specifically,  each 
unhappy agent (following an exogenously given order) will move to the nearest 
place where she becomes happy (if any), that is, to the nearest position on the 
line or in the circle where she attains the minimum fraction of like neighbors as 
determined by her tolerance level. In other words, Schelling models economic 
agents as simple machines that can compute the nearest location where the 
agent!s new mixed neighborhood satisfies her tolerance level of happiness, and ! '!
is able to act according to this computation: when it is an unhappy agent!s turn, 
the agent will either decide to move or to stay. 
2.2. From machines to more rational agents 
Let us now consider a completely different framework from the above scenario: 
a rational agent. We will examine an instance of a society with eight agents: 
four black agents and four white agents. The agents are displayed as a ring (a 
circle) with alternative colors (Figure 1a). Let us fix a mild tolerance level, in 
other words, each agent wants to share at least one neighbor like her (out of the 
two actual neighbors). Suppose that agents must find their closest matching 
location only clockwise. Notice that the society in this example is an unhappy 
society since no individual exceeds her tolerance level. Consequently, starting 
from the top individual and following in a clockwise direction, the eight players 
should  compute  the  nearest  place  and  move  to  that  place.  Following  the 
bounded rational dynamics suggested by Schelling, the final configuration is a 
fully  segregated  society.  Figure  2  illustrates  the  movements  and  how  a  fully 
segregated society is reached. 
Figure 1: Integration (a) versus segregation (b) with N=8 subjects 
Figure 2: Movements in the sequential game with bounded rational agents 
 
But what happens if all players are rational? This new situation can be modeled 
as an extensive game with eight players. Each player may choose two possible 
actions: to move or to stay. The final configuration depends on the path played ! (!
by all players and leads to a positive payoff (payoff 1) for each happy player and 
zero  otherwise.  Given  this  game,  we  can  compute  the  subgame  perfect 
equilibrium.  Players  will  choose  their  optimal  action  (to  move  or  to  stay)  by 
reasoning backwards, yielding the maximum grade of rationality since at any 
stage the individual should anticipate what would be the best response of the 
remaining  players  and  play  accordingly.  Actually,  this  problem  could  be 
considered difficult as the number of computations needed to act rationally can 
be exponential in the number of players. Moreover, we may find a multiplicity of 
equilibria  of  equilibrium  strategies,  but  only  two  final  possible  configurations: 
either the fully segregated society or a mixed configuration. 
Now let us enrich the payoff structure in the following way. Suppose that each 
player incurs a positive cost c if she decides to move. In such a case, a player 
may guarantee a positive payoff 1+c if she reaches a happy society and stays 
in  her  original  position.  Nevertheless,  if  she  reaches  the  happy  position  but 
moves, then she only guarantees the happiness payoff 1. In contrast, if she 
obtains  an  unhappy  situation  at  the  end  of  the  game,  she  will  earn  c  or  0 
depending on whether she stays or moves, respectively. Under this incentive 
structure, as Benito, Brañas, Hernández and Sanchis (2010) prove, there is a 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and therefore a unique equilibrium path 
identified by the movements of only players 4 and 8. 
In  this  new  “costly”  environment  with  rational  agents,  we  are  able  to 
characterize what is called a rational player. For instance, a rational player 1 
should  stay  in  her  initial  position  even  when  she  is  not  happy.  This  is  so 
because she can anticipate the best response of player 2, player 3, until player ! )!
8. In particular, the movement of player 8 as her best response will force the 
happiness of player 1. In the same way, player 2 will react identically, and so 
on. But what should be the prediction of a rational player off the equilibrium 
path?  
Suppose that player 1 has already moved between players 2 and 3. Therefore, 
both players become happy since player 2 is closer to player 8, both are white, 
and  player  1  and  3  (both  black)  stay  together.  This  action  is  not  on  the 
equilibrium path. When it is player 4!s turn to play, she has to choose an action 
given the above history that conveys information about the past agents! choices 
in the society. First, player 1 did not behave rationally. Second, she is not able 
to discriminate the rationality level of players 2 and 3. Hence, player 4 faces a 
dilemma: either the remaining players are all rational or they are not. If she 
considers the first assumption, then her best response following the backward 
induction methodology is to move. Nevertheless, she could consider a different 
approach  to  tackling  this  problem:  she  could  react  according  to  a  forward 
induction rather than a backward induction, in other words, player 4 assumes 
that the remaining players are rational depending on the rationality observed in 
the previous stages.  
 When players have to face unexpected events, they need to attach meaning to 
such events (see Govindan and Robson,1998). Namely, in our example, player 
4 has to interpret player 1!s action which may convey information about the 
agent!s level of rationality. Therefore, player 4 may generate different beliefs 
such as “no player is rational” or “with probability 2/3, players 5, 6, 7 and 8 are 
rational”. The first belief is consistent with the fact that player 1 is not rational ! *!
and the actions of players 2 and 3 do not convey any information. The second 
belief assumes that player 2 and 3 were rational and that player 1 was the only 
irrational  player.  Therefore  the  rest  of  the  society  should  have  the  same 
distribution  of  irrational  individuals.  When  player  4  computes  her  optimal 
strategy, her best response will naturally depend on these beliefs. 
This  stylized  example  stresses  the  difficulties  involved  in  defining  bounded 
rationality. The same action of player 4 could be explained as being that of a 
fully  rational  agent  or  exactly  the  opposite!  Therefore  different  actions  may 
convey a different level of rationality or not if we assume a change in reasoning. 
 2.3. Complexity theory and tractability of problems 
Complexity  theory  has  been  shown  to  be  a  useful  tool  for  determining  the 
significance  of  bounded  rationality  in  economic  decisions.  There  are  many 
approaches in computer science and mathematics that address the notion of 
complexity, which refers to the difficulty of a general task to be solved (see 
Kolgomorov 1998, Garey and Johnson 1979, Solomonov 2009). We focus on a 
particular dimension of this notion of complexity: time complexity. 
From the computational point of view a problem is a general question regarding 
some abstract object. For instance, a problem could be to determine whether 
there  exists  a  Nash  equilibrium  in  a  game  when  players  are  not  allowed  to 
randomize in the choice of their strategies (that is, the problem of determining 
the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium). 
An instance of a problem is the particularization of this general question. For 
example, to determine whether there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a ! "+!
“beauty contest” game (Nagel, 1995) with three players. The beauty contest is a 
guessing  game  where  all  agents  must  simultaneously  announce  a  number 
between 0 and 100. The player(s) whose announcement is closest to two-thirds 
of the mean wins a prize (for instance 90 euros), which is split equally in the 
case  of  ties.    For  instance,  suppose  that  there  are  n=3  players  who 
simultaneously announce 20, 30 and 40, respectively. In this case, 2/3 of the 
mean is 20 and player 1 gets the prize. Note that player 3 (who makes the 
highest  announcement)  regrets  her  announcement,  since  given  the  other 
players!  announcements  she  would  have  won  the  prize  by  announcing,  for 
instance, 13. In that case, 2/3 of the mean would have been 14 and she would 
have won the prize. In this respect, the announcements 20, 30 and 40 do not 
constitute  a  Nash  equilibrium.  Now  consider  the  new announcements  where 
player 3 anticipated the other players! actions and the announcements are: 20, 
30 and 13. Here, player 2 also regrets her decision: if she had announced 12, 
2/3 of the mean would have been 10 and she would have won the prize. Hence, 
the announcements 20, 30 and 13 do not constitute a Nash equilibrium either. It 
turns out that the only Nash equilibrium occurs when every player announces 0. 
Here,  everyone  gets  the  split  prize  (30  euros  each)  and  no  individual  has 
incentives  to  deviate  from  her  announcement.  Intuitively,  a  strictly  positive 
announcement by any player would trigger regret by some other player and only 
a zero announcement by all players can be sustained as an equilibrium. 
Even  though  the  answer  to  this  particular  instance  is  yes  (since  all  players 
guessing zero is an equilibrium in pure strategies), there are instances of other 
games where players cannot achieve an equilibrium in pure strategies. ! ""!
Another problem is to determine the best-response to other players! strategies 
in the beauty contest. A particular instance of this problem would be a set of 
strategies (guesses) by the other players (for instance, 30 and 40): the solution 
for this particular instance would be 20. In this particular problem, note that any 
instance or situation can be handled by a player with a relatively cheap amount 
of resources: just a small set of basic operations must be performed in order to 
give  a  best-reply  to  opponents!  strategies.  More  specifically,  this  amount  of 
computation  is  not  expected  to  increase  more  than  linearly  as  the  problem 
increases  with  the  number  of  opponents.  In  this  sense,  we  say  that  best-
replying in the beauty contest is a problem of linear (polynomial) complexity; an 
easy problem. In contrast, we may find other problems that are exponentially 
difficult in which only relatively small instances will be handled (solved) in a 
reasonable amount of time. 
A  usual  way  of  measuring  the  difficulty  or  complexity  of  an  instance  is  to 
measure the time that the most efficient machine (or algorithm) would take to 
solve  that  particular  instance.  Finally,  the  time-complexity  of  a  problem  is 
measured  as  the  worst  time  among  these  efficient  solutions  (worst-case 
complexity) or the average time among these efficient solutions (average-case 
complexity). In other words, the (worst case) time-complexity of a problem is the 
time that the best machine would take to solve the most difficult instance of that 
problem. Naturally, complexity must be measured as a function of the size of 
the  instance,  given  that  larger  instances  will  need  a  longer  time  to  be 
processed. ! "#!
Surprisingly, it has been shown that some problems are very difficult in nature, 
that is, machines will encounter difficulties to solve certain instances of these 
problems in a reasonable period of time. Or even worse, there are problems 
that  can  never  be  solved  by  regular  computers!  (for  a  detailed  study  of 
computational  complexity,  see  Garey  and  Johnson  1979).  This  proposition 
provides  a  very  sharp  intuition  of  the  natural  limitations  of  human  brains  in 
dealing with problems. 
Problems  of  such  intrinsic  complexity  include  the  computation  of  the  Nash 
equilibrium  or  best  responses  in  some  games.  This  makes  it  difficult  to 
associate human behavior with that of a completely rational agent playing the 
Nash equilibrium, and calls for a model of bounded rationality. In fact, many 
other  economic  environments,  such  as  the  formation  of  coalitions  or  the 
formation  of  economic  and  social  networks  involve  decisions  by  players  or 
social  planners  that  are  complex  in  nature.  Ballester  (2004),  for  instance, 
studies  the  difficulty  of  problems  faced  by  decision  makers  (social  planners) 
who must achieve the stable organization of society in the sense of minimizing 
the moves across different groups by “unhappy” agents. He shows that many 
general  problems  of  this  type  are  NP-complete,  a  computational  notion  of 
complexity that includes a vast amount of well-known problems that are very 
unlikely to be solved in polynomial time. 
 
3. Rationality and Information ! "$!
As we already pointed out, bounded rationality is related to situations where an 
agent!s  decision-making  process  does  not  completely  adhere  to  classical 
rationality assumptions. A further aspect of bounded rationality is incomplete 
information, which takes into account the possibility of scarce information about 
the actual state of the world when agents are faced with economic decisions. In 
principle, this latter concept is independent of rationality, that is, we can have 
fully rational agents making decisions in a world with uncertainty, or completely 
informed agents that are not fully rational, or both. 
In order to understand this distinction more clearly, we will illustrate it by means 
of the beauty contest explained in section 2. 
3.1. An incomplete information setting 
Consider now a situation in which each player i is privately informed about the 
set  of  players  for  which  she  must  guess  2/3  of  their  mean,  that  is,  player i 
receives  a  guessing  assignment  that  only  she  knows.  This  assignment  is 
generated  by  some  random  rule  that  is  commonly  known  by  all  players.  A 
player!s strategy consists of a guess that is contingent on the assignment that 
she receives. 
One example could be a situation with n=2 players where every player is in her 
opponent!s guessing assignment with a probability of 1/2. Each player i would 
have  to  guess  about  all  2  players  with  a  probability  of  1/2;  and  only  about 
herself with a probability of 1/2 (in this case, the player has a clear advantage: 
her guess would be straightforward and she would earn something). ! "%!
The interesting point in this new incomplete information framework is that each 
player privately knows the set of players she must make predictions about (her 
guessing  assignment),  but  she  does  not  know  what  the  other  player  must 
guess. Hence, in one particular situation, player 1 could be randomly assigned 
to guess about players 1 and 2 and she would have this information, but she 
would not know which set of players player 2 must make predictions about. 
Here, a player must form beliefs about the actual guessing assignment of the 
other player. Moreover, she must also assess what beliefs the other player has 
about her own guessing assignment. And so on.  
In this new context of incomplete information, the equilibrium only occurs if both 
players announce 0, independently of the guessing assignment that they each 
received  according  to  the  assignment  rule.  Intuitively,  equilibrium  behavior 
under complete information also turns out to be an equilibrium under incomplete 
information. More importantly, in this particular example, it is the unique optimal 
behavior. 
 
3.2. Information and rationality 
We now turn our attention to the complete information case in order to relate our 
previous example to a bounded rationality setting. We use the same beauty 
contest framework, where bounded rationality is defined using the concept of k-
level rationality as in Nagel (1995). To simplify matters, we define a 0-rational 
player as one whose guess is a focal point such as 50. A 1-rational player is a 
player that best-replies to 0-rational opponents. For instance, in the case of 3 ! "&!
players,  a  1-rational  player  would  choose  the  best  guess  assuming  that  her 
opponents guess is 50, that is, her guess would be around 29. A 2-rational 
player would be a player that best-replies to 1-rational opponents (playing 29), 
so that she would play around 16 (for the sake of simplicity, we adopt a slightly 
different  notion  from  Nagel!s  definition  of  k-level  rationality).  Continuing  this 
reasoning ad infinitum, it would be easy to verify that an infinitely rational player 
would play 0, which is the Nash equilibrium. In many situations, infinitely rational 
players may not play some equilibria that are unstable or not reachable through 
this process. 
Yet can we relate levels of information to levels of rationality? For instance, in 
the case of incomplete information, let us define (as in Ballester, Ponti and van 
der Leij, 2010) a 1-informed player as a player who knows only her assignment, 
a  2-informed  player  as  a  player  who  knows  her  own  assignment  and  the 
assignment of the players appearing in her own assignment, a 3-informed agent 
would be defined accordingly, etc… It is important to note that in our example 
with incomplete information, two 2-informed players correspond to a game with 
complete information as long as the level of information possessed by each 
player is common knowledge: each player knows her own assignment and her 
opponent!s, and this is common knowledge. 
The  question  that  arises  is  whether  there  is  some  common  pattern  in  the 
behaviors of a boundedly-rational agent (for instance, a 1-level rational payer) 
and a partially informed agent (for instance, a 1-informed player). This problem 
has  been  addressed  in  Ballester  et  al.  (2010),  who  study  the  behavior  of 
experimental  subjects  under  both  frameworks.  Even  though  they  focus  on  a ! "'!
different  game  structure,  they  show  that  subjects  in  the  lab  tend  to  behave 
similarly under incomplete information and under rationality limitations. These 
two notions are different and it is difficult to provide a satisfactory theory for this 
feature.  This  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  task  of  mapping  levels  of 
information  to  levels  of  rationality  involves  building  an  ex-ante  link  between 
these two notions. 
In order to make this important point clear, let us return to our examples with the 
beauty contest. Note that a minimum level of information (like 1) by all players 
can lead to optimal equilibrium behavior (that is, guessing 0), while all players 
are  required  to  have  a  sufficiently  high  level  of  rationality  in  order  to  make 
guesses that are close to the unique zero-equilibrium. Partially informed agents 
are able to reason ad infinitum within their limited informational environments, 
while boundedly rational agents are only able to perform limited calculations in a 
complete information set-up. 
A  completely  different  approach  to  establishing  this  relationship  between 
information  and  rationality  has  been  proposed  by  computer  scientists.  The 
rationality-information  pair  can  be  easily  mapped  to  the  time-space  pair  in 
computer science. Suppose that a computer has to derive its optimal strategy 
(such as guessing in the beauty contest) against the other computers. The input 
of the machine is the information available about the game payoffs and possibly 
about  the  other  machines!  configurations.  Here  the  level  of  rationality  may 
correspond  to  the  complexity  of  the  machine  circuits,  while  the  level  of 
information  may  correspond  to  the  input  size  or  the  memory  size.  In  this 
computational  context,  at  least  one  direct  relationship  arises  between  both ! "(!
concepts: information bounds rationality in the sense that in order to read or 
process all the available information, we at least need computational resources 
in order to read it! This fundamental relationship is not considered under the 
game-theoretical approach where public or private information is assumed to be 
known  by  players,  but  the  process  by  which  agents  come  to  acquire  this 
knowledge is not specified. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored some of the fundamental difficulties involved in 
identifying bounded rationality in economics. On the one hand, these difficulties 
have to do with the distinction between rational behavior and rational thinking as 
shown  through  an  example  using  the  Schelling!s  segregation  game.  On  the 
other hand, there seems to be a link between rationality and information, but 
again it may be difficult to disentangle both dimensions from the observation of 
individual behavior. 
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Figure 1: Integration (a) versus segregation (b) with N=8 subjects 
 
 
Figure 2: Movements in the sequential game with bounded rational agents 
 